## 1 STATE OF MONTANA BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS 2 IN THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE NO. 17-98: 3 FRENCHTOWN EDUCATION 4 ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA, 5 Complainant, FINDINGS OF FACT; 6 VBC. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: AND RECOMMENDED ORDER FRENCHTOWN PUBLIC SCHOOLS. DISTRICT 40, FRENCHTOWN, 8 MONTANA. 9 Respondent. 10

#### I. INTRODUCTION

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On October 15, 1997, the Frenchtown Education Association (Association) filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that the Frenchtown Public School District, District No. 40, Frenchtown, Montana (District) violated § 39-31-401(1), (4), and (5), MCA. The Association alleged that the District unilaterally changed a mandatory subject of bargaining by modifying a long standing practice of paying the registration fee for courses offered for horizontal movement on the salary schedule and began requiring certain teachers pay registration fees themselves. In particular, in June, 1997, the District notified teacher Kathy Gaul that it would allow her horizontal movement only if she paid the registration fee for an otherwise acceptable course. The Association also alleged that the District actions violated § 39-31-401(1) and (4), MCA, by retaliating against Gaul for filing a grievance and prevailing in an arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.

Hearing Officer Michael T. Furlong conducted a hearing on this matter on October 7, 1998 at the Frenchtown School, Frenchtown, Montana. The Association was represented by Karl Englund, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana. The District was represented by Don K. Klepper, Ph.D., Missoula, Montana. Kay Winters, Cathy Childs, Patti Nau, Kathy Gaul, and Mary Brannin appeared as witnesses for the Association. Peggy Anderson appeared as a witness on behalf of the District.

The Association's Exhibits 1 through 12 and District's Exhibits A through T were admitted into evidence. Parties completed submittal of post-hearing briefs and reply briefs on November 19, 1998.

## II. ISSUES

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Whether the District committed unfair labor practices in violation of § 39-31-401(1), (4) and (5), MCA.

## III. FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. The Association is the exclusive bargaining representative for certified staff employed by the District. The Association and the District have been parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements for a number of years. On April 1, 1995, the Association and the District executed a three year collective bargaining agreement which expired on June 30, 1998. (Respondent's Exhibit A).
- 2. The collective bargaining agreement establishes a salary schedule, Id. at Appendix A, by which salary is based on an employee's education and experience. Educational credits for

This contract was in force and effect at the time of this dispute.

advancement on the salary schedule are earned in a variety of ways. Teachers may earn college credits at an institution of higher education. In addition, teachers have a continuing education requirement by which they must earn 60 credits every five years to renew their teaching certificates. Credits earned taking classes that are accredited for continuing education units, also known as renewal units or recertification units, may be used for advancement on the salary schedule.

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Section 7.4 of the collective bargaining agreement,
 which governs salary advancement, provides:

All college credits and/or renewal units acceptable towards Montana Teacher's Certification or renewal of teaching certification will be accepted as additional professional preparation to advance the teachers preparation status on the salary schedule to the BA + 45 level. Movement beyond the BA + 45 to BA + 60 level requires the completion of a masters degree in an educations related field or the equivalent of (15) additional quarter credits and/or 150 renewal units completed after July 1, 1991. All credits applied towards movement from BA + 45 to BA + 60 and all credits beyond the masters degree level must receive prior approval of the superintendent. These credits will be based on the following criteria:

- BA + 45 to BA + 60 1.) Graduate or approved undergraduate credits and/or renewal units within an approved program focused on specific educational goals that fit a need of the district.
  - Be otherwise accepted by the superintendent.
- MA to MA + 15-30-45 1.) Graduate or approved undergraduate credits and/or renewal units focused on specific educational goals that fit a need of the district.
  - Be otherwise accepted by the superintendent.

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- 5. Kathy Gaul has been employed as a teacher within the District and a member in good standing of the Association since September 1985. In March 5, 1997, she learned of a class that would be offered on April 17, 1997 by the University of the Pacific entitled "Simply Science." It was Gaul's understanding that the District would pay the registration fee for the class.
- 6. On March 5, 1997, Gaul submitted her initial "Teacher Request for Approval of Credit" to the District for the course. She indicated on the form that she wished to use credits for salary advancement (Complainant's Exhibit 2(A)).
- 7. On March 11, 1997, the District superintendent denied Gaul's request to use the credits for salary advancement, stating it would not be allowed because the District was paying or contributing to the class. The Superintendent explained that the District was willing to pay the registration fee for teachers who attended the class but only on the condition that teachers not

use the credits earned for salary advancement. Gaul enrolled and successfully completed the class. The District paid the \$49.00 registration fee for Gaul.

- 8. On April 29, 1997, Gaul again sought approval for use of the credits earned for salary advancement (Complainant's Exhibit 2D). On May 15, 1997, the District superintendent approved the request on the condition that Gaul pay the registration fee. On June 5, 1997, Gaul reimbursed the District in the amount of \$49,00 for the cost of the registration fee.
- 9. According to the Association's president, Mary Brannin, and Association's grievance officer, Cathy Childs, this was the first instance in which the District based the decision to approve the credits solely on whether the District paid the registration fee. Childs prepared a list of classes either sponsored by the District or paid for by the District which included examples of teachers who used the credits earned for salary advancement (Association Exhibit 6).
- 10. Patricia Nau is also a teacher employed by the District. Nau attended the "Simply Science" class on April 17, 1997. The District paid the registration fee for the class (Complainant Exhibit 5). The District also approved the course credit Nau earned for advancement on the salary schedule.
- 11. On June 7, 1997, the Association filed a grievance pursuant to Section 7.4 of the collective bargaining agreement (District Exhibit A) on behalf of Kathy Gaul which stated:

The Frenchtown Education Association files this grievance on behalf of Kathy Gaul. This grievance concerns a one-credit workshop which Mrs. Gaul attended on April 19, 1997. The credit was approved by the superintendent, Mr. John Hargrove, with the stipulation that Mrs. Gaul would pay the entire cost of the workshop and the university credit and

would not be eligible to use Eisenhower funds to cover the workshop portion of the fee. It is our belief that this policy is in violation of our collective bargaining agreement, Prenchtown School District #40 Master Contract, including, but not limited to Article VII, Professional Compensation, Section 7.4, Recognition for Additional Preparation, as well as the school district's past practice.

The following relief is sought:

- (1) The district will reimburse Kathy Gaul for the workshop portion of the fee (\$49.00), while still approving the credit for advancement on the salary schedule.
- (2) The district will make the grievant (Kathy Gaul) whole for any losses and will provide any relief called for. Exhibit 3(a).
- 12. On June 12, 1997, Peggy L. Anderson, Elementary
  Principal, wrote to Mary Brannin, Association Grievance
  Representative:

In response to your letter received June 7, 1997, concerning the grievance filed on behalf of Kathy Gaul. It is not within my level of administrative responsibility to resolve this issue. The final decision for this rests with the Superintendent of Schools per the Master Agreement, Article VII, Section 7.4, pages 11 and 12. Exhibit 3b).

13. On June 17, 1997, Mary Brannin, Association Grievance Representative, wrote to Superintendent Hargrove and stated:

The Frenchtown Education Association wishes to appeal to Level II the grievance filed on behalf of Kathy Gaul. The grievance was denied at Level I by the principal, Dr. Peggy Anderson, on the grounds that a decision on this matter was not within her level of administrative responsibility. This initial denial was received by the F. E. A. on June 12, 1997. We would like to now proceed with the Level II meeting as soon as possible. Exhibit 3(c).

- 14. Superintendent Hargrove scheduled a Level II grievance meeting for Gaul for Monday, July 7, 1997. The meeting was subsequently rescheduled and conducted on July 9, 1997.
- 15. On July 15, 1997, Superintendent Hargrove notified the Association grievance representative by letter that he was

denying the grievance at Level II indicating he could find no breach of contract language to support the Association's allegations.

16. On July 21, 1997, Gaul submitted a written appeal to Superintendent Hargrove which stated:

I wish to appeal both the 9-credit and the 1-credit grievances to Level III, the Board of Trustees. I believe it would be more convenient for everyone involved if both grievances were scheduled for the same board meeting. I know that Cathy Childs has already talked to you regarding the fact that some of the people who need to be at this meeting are unavailable during the last two weeks of July. I just wanted to let you know that I do not mind waiting until early September to schedule the grievance meeting with the Board of Trustees. Please notify Cathy Childs, Mary Brannin, and myself as to when this board meeting will be held.

- 17. Initially, the Level III grievance was scheduled to be heard at the July 28, 1997 Board meeting. However,
  Superintendent Hargrove informed the Association representatives that the Board members would not be available to meet until late in September 1997. Therefore, the level III grievance meeting set for on July 28, 1997 had to be canceled. Both parties agreed to postpone the matter until the Board meeting in late September 1997.
- 18. On July 22, 1997, the Association grievance representative Mary Brannin wrote to Dennis Hutchison, Board Chair, and stated:

The Frenchtown Education Association wishes to appeal to Level III the grievance filed on behalf of Kathy Gaul in regard to the one-credit class. This grievance was denied at Level II by the superintendent, John Hargrove after a meeting was held on July 9, 1997, in accordance with the grievance procedure in the master agreement.

We would like to schedule this meeting along with the Level III meeting on the sabbatical credits at the same time. We would be willing to wait until a September date should this be more convenient for the board members. Please contact Cathy Childs or myself as to a possible meeting time. Exhibit 3(f).

19. On September 2, 1997, the parties agreed to a hearing concerning the Gaul grievances at the board meeting scheduled for September 24, 1997. Both parties agreed that there were two separate grievances to be heard, one involving the one credit "Simply Science" class, and one involving credit for the multiple graduate classes she had completed during her sabbatical.

20. On September 24, 1997, the Board conducted the level III hearing on the grievance. At the hearing, the Association's representatives stated that they were not advancing the grievance under Article VII, Section 7.4 (Complainant's Exhibit A), as they had previously indicated. Rather, the Association advanced the grievance to Level III based on the contention that the District had unilaterally changed the past practice concerning payment of course registration fees for the teachers.

21. The Board denied the Association's request for a ruling on past practice, contending there was no maintenance of standards language found in the contract concerning that issue. The Board determined that pursuant to Section 13.4° of the contract, the parties were precluded from bargaining concerning

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<sup>213.4</sup> Scope of Agreement

This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and no verbal statements or past practices supercede any of its provisions. Any amendment supplemental hereto shall not be binding upon either party unless executed by the parties hereto. The parties further acknowledge that during the course of collective bargaining each party has the unlimited right and opportunity to offer, discuss, accept or reject proposals. Therefore, for the term of this Agreement, no further collective bargaining shall be had upon any provisions of this Agreement, nor upon any subject of collective bargaining; unless by mutual consent of the parties hereto.

1 the issue of past practice during the term of the contract without mutual consent of the parties. On October 1, 1997, the District formally notified the Association by letter that the Board denied the Gaul grievance at level III.

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22. The Association responded to Superintendent Hargrove on October 13, 1997, as follows:

In spite of the fact that the Association is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board on this grievance, we will not be submitting the grievance to arbitration. Instead, the Association will file Unfair Labor Practice charges against the School District with the Board of Personnel Appeals.

We have made this decision because both law and contract require us to select a single course of action at this stage of a dispute and we believe an Unfair Labor Practice charge to be preferable to arbitration in this case.

Please be advised that this choice does not constitute a waiver of our rights to pursue this case vigorously including making any arguments in the Unfair Labor Practice charge that we might have chosen to make in arbitration.

The Association filed ULP 17-98 on October 15, 1997, 23. accusing the Board of a violation of the contract for not paying the workshop fee, and of retaliation. Specifically, the Association charged:

The defendant School District violated 39-31-401 (1) and (5), MCA, when it unilaterally changed a mandatory subject of bargaining by unilaterally modifying a long standing practice of paying the registration fee for courses offered for horizontal movement on the salary schedule and began requiring certain teachers to pay the registration fee themselves. In particular in June, 1997, the School District notified teacher Kathy Gaul that it would allow her horizontal movement only if she paid the registration fee for an otherwise acceptable course.

The School District violated 39-31-401 (1) and (4), MCA, by retaliating against teacher Kathy Gaul for filing a grievance and prevailing in an arbitration pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement. In particular, the School District required Kathy Gaul to pay for registration when it did not require other teachers to do so.

The Association sought the following remedy:

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Cease and desist from making unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining, reinstate the practice of paying for the registration fee for courses taken for horizontal movement and reimburse Kathy Gaul \$49.00 for payment of registration fee for class for horizontal movement.

Cease and desist from retaliating against Kathy Gaul for exercising her rights under the law.

Additionally, the School District shall post an appropriate notice informing employees that it violated the law and that it will cease from continuing to do so.

- 24. Gaul and the Association assert that the District's decision not to pay the registration fee for the "Simply Science" course resulted from hostility towards Gaul, which began when she contested a decision denying her request for sabbatical leave.

  In the fall of 1995, Gaul applied for sabbatical leave as provided for in Section 8.6 of the collective bargaining agreement so she could attend the University of Montana. The District denied her request.
- Gaul filed a grievance regarding her leave request though the Association.
- 26. The grievance was processed through the grievance procedure to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Following the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator ordered the District to grant Gaul a sabbatical leave for the school year 1997-98, based on her October 28, 1995 leave request for the 1996-1997 school year, which the board improperly denied. (Association Exhibit 7).
- 27. Following the arbitrator's ruling, the District notified Gaul that she was to follow application procedures no later than November 1, 1996, if she was planning to request

sabbatical in accordance with the arbitrator's decision

(Complainant Exhibit 8). Gaul responded that she intended to
accept the leave and that according to the arbitrator's decision,
she need not apply again.

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- 28. The superintendent appointed a review committee to make a recommendation as to whether Gaul should be allowed sabbatical leave. The District asked the Association to participate in the review. However, the Association declined, referring to the arbitrator's order granting the sabbatical leave (Complainant Exhibit 12).
- 29. On April 14, 1997, Gaul submitted an application to have the credits earned from courses taken during the first semester of the sabbatical used for salary advancement (Complainant Exhibit 10). The District denied Gaul's request because the credits were earned during the sabbatical. As a result, the Association filed a grievance which was processed through the grievance procedure and arbitration. The arbitrator ruled in the Association's favor.
- 30. Gaul subsequently applied to have the credits earned for some courses taken during the second semester of the 1997-98 school year sabbatical used for salary advancement. The District also denied the request. Again, the Association filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. At the time of the hearing, that grievance was scheduled to go to arbitration.
- 31. Elementary Building Principal Peggy Anderson informed the elementary teaching staff in February or March 1997 that if they took the "Simply Science" class for salary advancement, they

would be required to pay their own registration fees. Anderson also discussed this issue with Gaul and other staff members on April 15 and April 22, 1997 during faculty meetings. Anderson indicated that the District was attempting to standardize its policies on paving for credits.

32. The District paid the registration fee for teacher Patricia Nau for a course entitled "The Learning Workshop" in April 1997. (District Exhibit H). The District maintained it paid Nau's registration fee in addition to letting her receive salary schedule advancement on the basis that she was receiving Eisenhower grant money. Gaul was not receiving Eisenhower money.

## IV. DISCUSSION/RATIONALE

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## Α. Refusal to bargain in good faith (violation of 5 39-31-401(1) and (5), MCA)

Montana Law requires public employers to bargain collectively in good faith with labor organizations representing their employees on issues of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment. \$39-31-305, MCA. The failure to bargain collectively in good faith is a violation of § 39-31-401(5), MCA.

The Association alleges the District violated § 39-31-401(1) and (5) MCA by unilaterally changing a mandatory subject of bargaining. Specifically, Association alleges that the District denied to may Gaul's registration fee for the "Simply Science" course because she elected to use the earned credit for salary advancement. Thus, it forced the Association to accept a change in a long standing past practice of the District paying the 28 registration fee while allowing the teachers to use the credits

for salary advancement without further bargaining during the term of the contract.

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The District denies that it changed its practice. It also contends that the Association waived its right to bargain by not requesting bargaining sooner, and that under Section 13.4 of the collective bargaining agreement (which it refers to as the contract's management rights or "zipper" clause), there is no maintenance of standards language concerning "past practice."

Therefore, the contract is "zipped" and the Association waived its rights to bargain over this issue.

The Montana Supreme Court has approved the practice of the Board of Personnel Appeals in using federal court and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent as guidance in interpreting the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act. State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals v. District Court, 183 Mont. 223, 598 P.2d 1117, 103 LRRM 2297 (1979); Teamsters Local No. 45 v. State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals, 195 Mont. 272, 635 P.2d 1310, 110 LRRM 2012 (1981); City of Great Falls v. Young (Young III), 211 Mont. 13, 686 P.2d 185, 119 LRRM 2682(1984).

The basic, fundamental purpose of labor relations is the good faith negotiation of the mandatory subjects of bargaining--wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. For an employer to make unilateral changes during the course of a collective bargaining relationship concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining is considered a violation of the requirement of good faith bargaining. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 50 LRRM 2177 (1962).

The collective bargaining agreement contained provisions bargained for by the parties which governed salary advancement and which did not condition the use of the credits for advancement on whether the District had paid any of the costs. Although the contract contained general language allowing the superintendent to determine the acceptability of classes for salary advancement, the District never conditioned acceptance of classes for credit on whether it paid the costs prior to the request by Kathy Gaul in March 1997. The District had a long standing practice of allowing classes to be used for credit if they met the other criteria of Section 7.4. The District has not identified a single instance prior to the incident involved which required a teacher to pay the registration fee in order to receive course credits for salary advancement.

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Although the law requires good faith bargaining prior to changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining, the parties to a collective bargaining agreement may waive their right to bargaining during the term of an agreement. The District relies on Section 13.4 or "zipper clause" of the collective bargaining agreement to support the assertion that the Association waived its right to bargain over the matter. A zipper clause must meet the standard of any other form of waiver. Angelus Block Co., 250 NLRB 868, 877 (1980).

In general, a zipper clause is an agreement by the parties to preclude further bargaining during the term of the contract. If the zipper clause contains clear and unmistakable language to that effect, the result will be that neither party can force the other party to bargain, during the term of the contract, about matters encompassed by the clause. That is, the zipper clause will "shield" from a refusal to bargain charge, a party to whom such a bargaining demand is made. Similarly, under such a clause, neither party can unilaterally institute, during the term of the contract, a proposal concerning a matter encompassed by the clause. That is, the zipper clause cannot be used as a "sword" to accomplish a change from the status quo.

Michigan Bell Telephone Company, 306 NLRB 281, 282 (1992).

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The Board has upheld the use of zipper clauses similar to the one contained in this agreement in support of a finding that a union waived its right to collective bargaining. Montana Public Employees Association v. Department of Justice, ULP No. 17-87(1988).

In The Mead Corporation, 318 NLRB 201, 1995 WL 461270 (1995), the National Labor Relations Board found that implementing changes in working conditions in this manner constituted an unfair labor practice. Both the Association and the District waived their rights to bargaining during the term of the agreement. This clause protects employees from unilateral changes in working conditions. By agreeing that one party cannot force another party to bargain, the parties have agreed to maintenance of the status quo without exception. Neither party may change the contract or an established practice without first bargaining. Since neither party is obligated to bargain, neither party can change the contract or an established practice. The zipper clause in this case precludes the District from implementing new terms or conditions of employment, in the absence of assent by the union. In other words, an agreement that neither party is obligated to bargain is a double-edged sword. It applies to both parties and because neither can be forced to bargain, neither can force the other to accept a change in the status quo. The fact that the Association did not request bargaining is irrelevant. The district committed an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally changed a term of employment without bargaining.

# B. Retaliation (violation of § 39-31-401(1), MCA)

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The Association alleges that the District's decision to condition approval of Gaul's Simply Science credits for movement on the salary schedule was motivated by retaliation for Gaul's grievances under the collective bargaining agreement. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 39-31-201." § 39-31-401(1), MCA. The filing and processing of grievances, whether according to the terms of a collective bargaining contract or informally in the absence of a contract, is concerted activity protected by § 39-31-201, MCA, and any denial of contractual benefits based on the employee's filing of grievances is therefore a violation of § 39-31-401(1), MCA. Columbia University, 236 NLRB 793 (1978); John Sexton & Co., 217 NLRB 80 (1975); Ernst Steel Corp., 212 NLRB 78 (1974); Interboro Contractors, 157 NLRB 1295 (1966) (holding that individual activity involving peaceful attempts to enforce collective bargaining agreement is protected concerted activity),

The NLRB's well settled rule is that motive is not a critical element in a charge of interference, coercion or intimidation for protected activity:

Interference, restraint and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn on the employer's motive or on whether the coercion succeed or failed. The test is whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to

American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959), (emphasis added).

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Put another way, the law does not require the charging party prove subjective intent. Rather, the test is an objective one -- whether the employer engaged in conduct which, a reasonable person would conclude, tends to interfere with the free exercise of the rights of the employees.

In its charge, the Association contends that there is a clear pattern of District abuse of Gaul beginning when she challenged the decision not to grant a sabbatical leave. The Association alleges that the charge is further supported by the fact that after Gaul challenged the District's decision, an arbitrator ruled in her favor. However, the District denial of Gaul's request for approval of credits is at issue in this case. The Association believes that it did so in retaliation for her pursuit of her contract grievances to arbitration.

Taking an adverse employment action against an employee based on the fact that she has filed a grievance under the Collective Bargaining Act violates § 39-31-401(1) and (3), MCA. Young v. City of Great Falls (Young II), 198 Mont. 349, 646 P.2d 512 (1982). Gaul filed her first grievance concerning her sabbatical in January of 1996. The arbitrator ruled in her favor in September 1996. Despite the District's initial effort to require her to reapply for the sabbatical, Gaul took her sabbatical in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. The District denied Gaul's request to use the Simply Science credits

on March 11, 1997. The events which gave rise to Gaul's second and third grievances occurred after March 11, 1997. The timing of the events does not support a finding of retaliatory treatment or suggest interference with employee rights under the Act.

## C. Alleged violation of §39-31-401(4), MCA.

The Association also alleges a violation of §39-31-401(4), MCA. Neither the evidence nor the arguments of the Association establish a violation of this provision. At hearing, the District maintained that its purpose in developing guidelines which prohibited using credits form the Simply Science course for salary advancement was to standardize its policies. This rationale is troubling in view of the fact that the District paid for Patricia Nau to take the class and allowed her to use the credits. It also paid for Nau to take another course. However, on balance the evidence does not establish either retaliatory intent or that the conduct tended to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Collective Bargaining Act.

## V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- The Board of Personnel Appeals has jurisdiction in these matters pursuant to § 39-31-405, MCA.
- The District violated § 39-31-401(1) and (5), MCA, by its action of unilaterally altering a mandatory subject of bargaining.
- The District did not interfere with, restrain, or coerce Kathy Gaul in violation of § 39-31-401(1) and (4), MCA.

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## VI. RECOMMENDED ORDER

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The District is hereby ordered:

- To rescind the rule requiring teachers to pay the L registration fee for classes if they intend to use the credits earned for salary advancement:
- 2. To reimburse all teachers who were required to pay the registration fee for classes solely because they intended to use for credit for advancement on salary schedule:
- 3. To cease the practice of unilaterally altering terms and condition of employment subject to the collective bargaining agreement without obtaining the agreement of the Association to bargaining:
- To reinstate all leave taken by teacher to participate in these proceedings;
- To post copies of the notice contained in Appendix A at conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, at the school district for a period of 60 days and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.

day of June, 1999.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By:

THAEL T. FURLONG

Hearing Officer

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